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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, S S .

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
ro
._
DOCKET NO. C V M-T-A

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.
SUNSHINE AUTO BROKERS, a
Maine partnership with a
principal place of business
in Winslow, Maine,
PERLEY DOYON, and
SCOTT DOYON,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMPLAINT FOR PRELIMINARY
AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
AND CIVIL PENALTIES

INTRODUCTION
This is an action under the Unfair Trade Practices Act,
5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-214 (1979 & Supp. 1987), the Used Car
Information Act,

10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1471-1477 (1980 & Supp.

1987),

and the Motor Vehicle Examination and Inspection Law,
29 M.R.S.A. §§ 2501-2525 (Supp. 1987) to obtain declaratory
relief and a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting
Defendants from engaging in unfair and deceptive practices in
the sale of used motor vehicles and to obtain civil penalties.
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

-• Plaintiff, State of Maine, a sovereign state, by and

through the Attorney General, commences this action under

FEB - 3 1388
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5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-214 (1979 & Sup p . 1987), commonly known as
the Unfair Trade Practices Act,

17-A M.R.S.A. § 4(2)

(1983),

29 M.R.S.A. §§ 2507 and 2507-A (Supp. 1987), and 10 M.R.S.A.
§§ 1474 and 1475 (1983 & Supp.

1987), to protect the public by

preventing and restraining Defendants from engaging in unfair
and deceptive trade practices.
2.

Sunshine Auto Brokers is a Maine partnership certified

by the State of Maine as a used car dealership with its
principal place of business on the Augusta Road in the Town of
Winslow, Kennebec County, Maine.
3.

Defendant Perley Doyon is a co-owner and co-partner of

Sunshine Auto Brokers.
4.

Defendant Scott Doyon is a co-owner and co-partner of

Sunshine Auto Brokers.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
3.

The sale of used motor vehicles is regulated by a

variety of statutory provisions contained in the Used Car
Information Act,

10 M.R.S.A.

§§ 1471-1477 (1980 & Supp.

1987)

and the Motor Vehicle Examination and Inspection Law,
29 M.R.S.A. §§ 2501-2525 (Supp. 1987).

Pursuant to the Used

Car Examination and Inspection Law, used motor vehicles offered
•r

for sale by a dealer must be able to meet the inspection
standards required by 29 M.R.S.A. § 2503 (Supp. 1987).

Used

motor vehicles offered for sale by dealers must also have
affixed to them a conspicuous written disclosure statement
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containing specified information required by statute.

The

information contained on the written disclosure statement
relative to cars which are able to pass inspection is governed
by 10 M.R.S.A.

§ 1475(1) & (2) (1980 & S u p p . 1987).

The

information contained on the written disclosure statement
relative to used motor vehicles which are unable to pass
inspection and must be rebuilt or repaired before being
operated on the highways (referred to as "reconstructable motor
vehicles") is governed by 10 M.R.S.A.

§ 1474(4)

(Supp. 1987).

Finally, a dealer may not release a vehicle to be test-driven
upon the highways by a consumer unless he has first removed the
prior inspection certificate,

inspected the vehicle,

and placed

a valid certificate of inspection on the vehicle pursuant to
29 M.R.S.A.

§ 2507 (Supp. 1987).

Accordingly, vehicles which

fail to meet the inspection standards may not be test driven on
the highways.
4.

. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.

§ 207 (1979),

it is a violation

of the Unfair Trade Practices Act to engage in unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce in the State of Maine.

Pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A.

§ 1477

(1980 & Supp. 1987), violations of the Used Car Information Act
r

are per se violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
COUNT ONE
5.

As is more specifically set forth below, on a number

of occasions Defendants sold or transferred motor vehicles,
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which were owned or controlled by Defendants,

for operation

upon highways, when those motor vehicles failed to meet
inspection standards required by 29 M.R.S.A. § 2503 (Supp.
1987) and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder,

and

did not display a valid certificate of inspection issued during
the last 30 days prior to the date of sale or transfer:
a.

On or about the 30th day of June, 1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants sold or transferred a
certain motor vehicle, more specifically,

a 1977 Saab

99, vehicle identification number 99777002837, to
Peter Keaton, when said motor vehicle,

in fact, failed

to meet the inspection standards required by
29 M.R.S.A. § 2503 (Supp. 1987) and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder,

and did not

display a valid certificate of inspection issued
during the last 30 days prior to the date of sale or
transfer ;
b.

On or about the 1st day of July, 1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants sold or transferred a
certain motor vehicle, more specifically,
r

a 1978

Mercury Monarch, vehicle identification number
8W34L540410 when said motor vehicle,

in fact, failed

to meet the inspection standards required by
29 M.R.S.A. § 2503 (Supp. 1987) and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder,

and did not
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display a valid certificate of inspection issued
during the last 30 days prior to the date of sale or
transfer ;
c.

On or about the 15th day of July, 1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants sold or transferred a used
motor vehicle, more specifically,

a 1983 Nissan

Stanza, vehicle identification number
JN1HT1457DT106366, to Nancy Cleary, when said motor
vehicle,

in fact, failed to meet the inspection

standards required by 29 M.R.S.A. § 2503 (Supp. 1987)
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder,
and did not display a valid certificate of inspection
issued during the last 30 days prior to the date of
sale or transfer;
d.

On or about the 1st day of October,

1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants sold or transferred a
certain motor vehicle, more specifically,

a 1978 Dodge

Aspen station wagon, vehicle identification number
NL45D8B128054, to Darlene Stratton, when said motor
vehicle,

in fact, failed to meet the inspection

standards required by 29 M.R.S.A. § 2503 (Supp. 1987)
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
and did not display a valid certificate of inspection
issued during the last 30 days prior to the date of
sale or transfer;

6
e.

On or about the 2nd day of October,

1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants sold or transferred a
certain motor vehicle, more specifically,

a 1982

Plymouth Horizon, vehicle identification number
1P3BM18A6CD264748, to Dawn Johnson, when said motor
vehicle,

in fact, failed to meet the inspection

standards required by 29 M.R.S.A. § 2503 (Supp.

1987)

and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder,
and did not display a valid certificate of inspection
issued during the last 30 days prior to the date of
sale or transfer.
6.

Defendants'

conduct as set forth in each of

subparagraphs 5(a) through (e) constitutes separate and
distinct violations of 29 M.R.S.A. § 2507-A (Supp. 1987) and
10 M.R.S.A. § 1474(1)
7.

(1980 & Supp. 1987).

Defendants' conduct as set forth in paragraph 5

constitutes a pattern or practice of unfair and deceptive
conduct in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
COUNT TWO
8.

As is more specifically set forth below, on a number

of occasions, Defendants sold, negotiated the sale of, offered
for sale, or transferred motor vehicles when those motor
vehicles did not have affixed to them a conspicuous written
disclosure statement containing the information required by
10 M.R.S.A. § 1475(1) & (2) (1980 & Supp. 1987):
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a.

On or about the 1st day of July,

1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants sold, negotiated the sale
of, offered for sale, or transferred a certain motor
vehicle, more specifically,

a 1978 Mercury Monarch,

vehicle identification number 8W34L540410 when said
motor vehicle did not,

in fact, have affixed to it a

conspicuous written disclosure statement containing
the information required by 10 M.R.S.A. § 1475(1) &
(2) (1980 & Supp. 1987);
b.

On or about the 15th day of July, 1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants sold, negotiated the sale
of, offered for sale, or transferred a certain motor
vehicle, more specifically a 1983 Nissan Stanza,
vehicle identification number JN1HT1487DT106366, when
said motor vehicle did not,

in fact, have affixed to

it a conspicuous written disclosure statement
containing the information required by 10 M.R.S.A.
§ 1475(1) & (2) (1980 & Supp.
c.

1987);

On or about the 1st day of October,

1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants sold, negotiated the sale
of, offered for sale, or transferred a certain motor
vehicle, more specifically,

a 1978 Dodge Aspen station

wagon, vehicle identification number NL45D8B128054,
when said used motor vehicle did not, in fact, have
affixed to it a conspicuous written disclosure
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statement containing the information required by
10 M.R.S.A.
d.

§ 1475(1) & (2) (1980 & Sup p . 1987);

On or about the 2nd day of October,

1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants negotiated the sale of,
offered for sale, or transferred a certain motor
vehicle, more specifically a 1982 Plymouth Horizon,
vehicle identification number 1P3BM18A6CD264748, when
said used motor vehicle did not,

in fact, have affixed

to it a conspicuous written disclosure statement
containing the information required by 10 M.R.S.A.
§ 1475(1) & (2) (1980 & Supp.
e.

1987);

On or about the 2nd day of October,

1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants sold, negotiated the sale
of, offered for sale, or transferred a certain motor
vehicle, more specifically,

a Custom Ford pick-up

truck, vehicle identification number 33HF150D24G13,
did not,

in fact, have affixed to it a conspicuous

written disclosure statement containing the
information required by 10 M.R.S.A. § 1475(1) & (2)
(1980 & Supp. 1987);
f.

On or about the 2nd day of November,

1987,

Defendants sold, negotiated the sale of, offered for
sale, or transferred a certain motor vehicle, more
specifically, a Chevrolet Custom Deluxe Series 10
pick-up truck, vehicle identification number
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CKL1481137838, when said motor vehicle did not, in
fact, have affixed to it, a conspicuous disclosure
statement containing the information required by
10 M.R.S.A.
g.

§ 1475(1) & (2) (1980 & Supp. 1987);

On or about the 2nd day of November,

1987,

Defendants sold, negotiated the sale of, offered for
sale, or transferred a certain motor vehicle, more
specifically,

a Plymouth Horizon, vehicle

identification number IP3BL28BXBD244607, when said
motor vehicle did not, in fact, have affixed to it a
conspicuous written disclosure statement containing
the information required by 10 M.R.S.A. § 1475(1) &
(2);

h.

On or about the 2nd day of November,

1987,

Defendants sold, negotiated the sale of, offered for
sale, or transferred a certain motor vehicle, more
specifically,

an Oldsmobile Delta 88, vehicle

identification number 3L69YAX100013, when said motor
vehicle did not,

in fact, have affixed to it, a

conspicuous written disclosure statement containing
the information required by 10 M.R.S.A.

§ 1475(1) &

<•
(2) (1980 & Supp.
9.

1987).

Defendants' conduct as set forth in each of

subparagraphs 8(a) through (h) constitutes separate and
distinct violations of 10 M.R.S.A. § 1475(1) & (2) (1980 &
Supp. 1987).
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10.

Defendants’ conduct as set forth in paragraph 8

constitutes a pattern or practice of unfair or deceptive
conduct in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
COUNT THREE
11.

As is more specifically set forth below, on a number

of occasions Defendants permitted motor vehicles, which were
owned or controlled by Defendants, to be released for operation
upon the highways prior to removing the prior inspection
certificate,

inspecting the vehicle,

and placing a valid

certificate of inspection on the vehicle:
a.

On or about the 30th day of June, 1987, in the

Town of Winslow, Defendants permitted a vehicle, more
specifically,

a 1977 Saab 99, vehicle identification

number 99777002837, which vehicle was owned or
controlled by Defendants, to be released for
test-driving upon the highways prior to removing the
prior inspection certificate,

inspecting the vehicle,

and placing a valid certificate of inspection on the
vehicle ;
b.

On or about the 2nd day of November,

Town of Winslow,

1987, in the

Defendants permitted a vehicle, more

■r

specifically,

a 1980 Oldsmobile Delta 88, vehicle

identification number 3L69YAX100013, which vehicle was
owned or controlled by Defendants, to be released for
test-driving upon the highways prior to removing the
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prior inspection certificate,

inspecting the vehicle,

and placing a valid certificate of inspection on the
v e hicle.
12.

Defendants' conduct as set forth in each of

subparagaphs 11(a) through (b) constitutes separate and
distinct violations of 29 M.R.S.A. § 2507 (Supp. 1987).
13.

Defendants'

conduct as set forth in paragraph 11

constitutes a pattern or practice of unfair and deceptive
conduct in violation of 5 M.R.S.A.

§ 207 (1979).

COUNT FOUR
14.

a.

On or about the 30th day of June, 1987,

Defendants sold, negotiated the sale of, offered for
sale, or transferred a reconstructable motor vehicle,
more specifically,

a 1977 Saab 99, vehicle

identification number 99777002837, when said
reconstructable motor vehicle did not, in fact, have
affixed to it a conspicuous written disclosure
statement containing the information required by
14 M.R.S.A.
b.

§ 1474(4)

(Supp. 1987).

On or about the 1st day of October,

in the Town

of Winslow, Defendants sold, negotiated the sale of,
p
offered for sale, or transferred a certain
reconstructable motor vehicle, more specifically,

a

1978 Dodge Aspen station wagon, vehicle identification
number NL45D8B128054, when said reconstructable motor
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vehicle did not,

in fact, have affixed to it a

conspicuous written disclosure statement containing
the information required by 10 M.R.S.A.

§ 1474 (Supp.

1987) .
15.

Defendants' conduct as set forth in each of

subparagraphs 14(a) through (b) constitutes separate and
distinct violations of 10 M.R.S.A. § 1474(4)
16.

Defendants'

(Supp. 1987).

conduct as set forth in paragraph 14

constitutes a pattern or practice of unfair and deceptive
conduct in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
R E L IEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE,

complainant respectfully requests that this

court :
1.

Declare that Defendants have violated 29 M.R.S.A.

§ 2507 (Supp. 1987) and 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 (1979) by permitting
vehicles to be released for operation upon the highways prior
to removing the prior inspection certificate,

inspecting the

vehicles, and placing a valid certificate of inspection on the
vehicles.
2.

Declare that Defendants have violated
29 M.R.S.A.
*

§ 2507-A (Supp. 1987), 10 M.R.S.A. § 1474(1) (Supp. 1987), and
r
5 M.R.S.A. § 207 (1979) by selling or transferring used motor
vehicles for operation upon the highways when said motor
vehicles failed to meet the inspection standards required by
29 M.R.S.A. § 2503 (Supp.

1987).
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3.

Declare that Defendants has violated 10 M.R.S.A.

§ 1474(4)

(Supp.

1987) and 5 M.R.S.A.

§ 207 (1979) by failing

to affix the required disclosure statement to his used motor
vehicles offered for sale as reconstructable motor vehicles.
4.

Declare that Defendants have violated 10 M.R.S.A.

§ 1475(1) & (2) (1980 & Supp.

1987) and 5 M.R.S.A.

§ 207 (1979)

by failing to affix the required disclosure statement to his
used cars.
5.

Order the Defendants to pay civil penalties pursuant

to 29 M.R.S.A. § 2507-A(3)

(Supp. 1987) for each violation of

29 M.R.S.A. § 2507-A(1) (Supp.
6.

1987).

Order the Defendants to pay civil penalties pursuant

to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1477(2)

(Supp.

1987) for each violation of

10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1474(1) & (2) and 1475(1) & (2) (1980 & Supp.
1987) .
7.

Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction pursuant

to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 (Supp.
their agents, employees,

1987) enjoining the Defendants,

assigns, or other persons acting for

the Defendants or under their control, from:
A.

violating any provision of the Used Car

Information Act,

10 M.R.S.A. § 1471 et se q . (1980 &

■r

Supp. 1987);
B.

violating any provision of the Motor Vehicle

Examination and Inspection Law, 29 M.R.S.A. § 2501 et
seq■ (Supp. 1987);
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C.

engaging in any unfair or deceptive acts or

practices with regard to the sale of used motor
vehicles.
8.

Order the Defendants to pay the costs of this suit and

of the investigation of the Defendants by the Attorney General.
9.

Grant such other relief as the court deems just and

equitable.
DATED:

February 3, 1988

JAMES E. TIERNEY
Attorney General

l

IJ

'i-/

STEPHEN L. WESSLER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Consumer and Antitrust Division

AMY M . /ROMAN S
Assistami Attorney General
Consumer and Antitrust Division
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 289-3661

FED - 3 ¡988

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
Docket No. CV-88-42

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
vs.

'

DECISION and ORDER

SUNSHINE AUTO BROKERS,
PERLEY DOYON and SCOTT DOYON,
Defendant

This matter is before the court for decision after trial on
the State's complaint,

as amended,

charging the defendants with a

number of violations of the Used Car Information Act,
§§

1471-1477

and

the

Maine

Motor

Vehicle

10 M.R.S.A.

Inspection

Laws,

29

M.R.S.A. §§ 2501-2525.

A large number of violations of these laws

are

out

asserted

arising

of

auto

sales

transactions

individuals and 2 site visits by a state investigator.
Auto Brokers

is

a partnership

of Perley Doyon

which sells used cars on a lot in Winslow, Maine.
and the

individually named

defendants

and

with

9

Sunshine

Scott

Doyon

The partnership

are acting together

used car dealer as that term is defined in 10 M.R.S.A.

as a

§ 1471(2).

They are jointly and severely responsible for the actions of their
used car dealership and its agents.
The requirements for inspection of vehicles offered for sale
as used motor vehicles,’ disclosure of inspectability and condition
of

the

vehicles

and

waiver

of

such

requirements

controlled by the statutes at issue in this case.

are

closely

Those statutes

2
will be addressed prior to reviewing the evidence of the alleged
violations
decision

so

that

the

statutory

background

upon

is based is clear and so that the various

which

this

statutes

at

issue do not need to be readdressed in discussing each separate
sale and investigative report.
First,

the court would note the very narrow exemptions which

may apply to these broad statutory requirements.
days the rule may have been,

While in the old

as defendants assert,

that

"you get

what you pay for," state laws have now intervened to provide a new
level of protection.
vehicle

has

requirements

Today a dealer's

been

insp e c t e d

or has

disclosed

imposed by 10 M.R.S.A.
between the

buyer

vehicle

is

inspection

sold
and

either

meets

upon it points

inspection

requiring

repair,

§ 1474(1), may not be waived by agreement

and the

M.R.S.A. § 1474(2) .

and

required warranty that a

dealer or the

conduct

of either,

10

Thus, a provision in a sales agreement that a

"as

is"

disclosure

does

not

waive

requirements,

or

void

Thurber v.

statutory

Bill

Martin

Chevrolet, 487 A.2d 631 (Me. 1985) .
In addition,
to all vehicles

the inspection and disclosure requirements apply
sold or transferred by

a dealer

regardless

of

condition unless those vehicles are specifically sold for parts or
scrap and there is conspicuously written on the contract of sale
the words:

"This vehicle is sold for parts or scrap and not for

transportation."
specifically

10 M.R.S.A.

written

on

the

§ 1472.

Unless

sales

contract,

those

words

are

the

used

car

inspection and disclosure requirements discussed herein apply to
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the vehicle sale.
With the limited exclusions discussed,
address the

statutory requirements

the court proceeds to

relevant to determination of

this case.
A used car dealer warrants that every used motor vehicle sold
and not exempt pursuant to § 1472 has been inspected by a licensed
inspection mechanic

for the

purpose

of determining whether

the

vehicle meets the inspection standards required by 29 M.R.S.A.
2503

and the

M.R.S.A.

§

rules

warrants

the

that

the

promulgated thereunder.

This

does

not

vehicle

will

pass

1474(1)

that

warrant

and regulations

vehicle

mean

meet

10

dealer

the

inspection.

either

can

that

The

state

§

must

dealer

inspection

standards or, for those vehicles which cannot pass inspection, the
dealer
vehicle

warrants
and

statement

is

that
in

which

1474(1)(A) & (B).
a vehicle

is

the

the

must

be

vehicle

condition
affixed

is

a

reconstructible

specified
to

the

on

vehicle

the
10

motor

disclosure
M.R.S.A.

§

The warranty of inspectability is violated when

sold with

a valid

inspection

certificate

vehicle does not meet state inspection standards.

but

the

10 M.R.S.A.

§

1474 (1) (A) .
"As is"

vehicles

are those

vehicles

which

are

offered

for

sale without the inclusion of any express or implied warranties.
However,

because the warranty of inspectability cannot be waived

or disclaimed,

"as is" vehicles must be inspected prior to being

offered for sale unless they are exempt under § 1472.
Bill Martin Chevrolet, supra. at 632.

Thurber v.
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Every used motor vehicle sold by a dealer for the purpose of
transportation
statement

must

called

1475(1).

a

have

affixed

"Used Vehicle

to

it

Buyers

a

written

Guide,"

disclosure

10 M.R.S.A.

§

The dealer is responsible for providing the information

set forth on this disclosure

form,

including the nature of the

prior use,

how the vehicle was acquired by the dealer,

mechanical

defects

and/or substantial damage to the vehicle and

whether there are any express and/or implied warranties
with the vehicle.
An

any known

included

10 M.R.S.A. § 1475(2).

additional

disclosure

reconstructible motor vehicles,

statement

is

required

for

those vehicles which do not meet

the state inspection standards and require repair work before an
inspection sticker will be issued.

10 M.R.S.A.

§ 1474(4). , The

dealer must affix to any reconstructible motor vehicle offered for
sale

a

disclosure

M.R.S.A. § 1474(4).
Motor

Vehicle

licensed
within

form

entitled

days

Motor

Vehicle, "

disclosure

prior

form,

to

the

which

following
date

of

must
an

be

completed

inspection

sale,

must

of the

components

which must

contain

meet

the

inspection standards and the specific components which
do meet the inspection standards;
—

the make, model, year, and VIN of the reconstructible

motor vehicle;
—

the

by

a

conducted

following information:
— v a statement

10

Pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1474(4), the Unsafe

inspection mechanic

60

"Unsafe

signature and inspection license number of the

the

5
inspection mechanic who performed the inspection;
—

the date the inspection was performed; and

—

a statement that the vehicle must be towed from the

premises.
The disclosure- statement must be affixed to the vehicle,
it may not be removed from the vehicle by the dealer.

The dealer

must provide the purchaser with a copy of the disclosure
and dated by the purchaser.

and

signed

The dealer must retain a copy of the

disclosure for three years after the date of sale.
Pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1477(1), violations of the used car
inspection

and

disclosure

requirements

are

violations

of

the

Unfair Trade Practice Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-214.
In addition,
not less than

violators may be subject to a civil penally of

$100 nor more than $1000

M.R.S.A. § 1477(2).

However,

for each violation.

10

a dealer may not be held liable for

a civil violation if the dealer shows "by a preponderance of the
evidence
error,

that

the

violation

was

unintentional

notwithstanding the maintenance

adopted to avoid any such error.

and

a bona

of procedures

fide

reasonably

Id.

Used car inspection requirements are separately addressed in
Title 2-9.
released

No vehicle may be operated on the highways or sold or
for

inspection
1474(1)(A).
for

the

operation

requirements,

on

the
29

highways

M.R.S.A.

§

without
2503;

passing
10

state

M.R.S.A.

§

A used motor vehicle sold or transferred by a dealer

purpose

of

operation

on

the

highways

inspected within 30 days prior to the day of sale.

must

have

been

29 M.R.S.A. §

6
2507-A(l).

The only vehicles which may be sold exempted from this

inspection provision are reconstructible motor vehicles which will
not pass inspection.

They must have been inspected within 60 days

prior to sale, 10 M.R.S.A. § 1474(4)(C), and must be sold with the
required disclosures'.
Violations of 29 M.R.S.A.

§ 2507-A(l)

are subject to a civil

penalty of not more than $1000 for each violation,

and a violation

is also deemed a violation of the Unfair Trade Practice Laws,

5

M.R.S.A. § 206-214.
Prior to releasing a used motor vehicle for test driving upon
public highways,
valid

a dealer must have the vehicle inspected and a

certificate

M.R.S.A.

§

of

2507.

inspection
If

the

placed

vehicle

on

has

a

the

vehicle.

prior

certificate, the prior certificate must be removed.

29

inspection

Id.

Vehicles

which have not been reinspected while in the dealer's possession
and vehicles which have been

reinspected but did not meet

state

inspection standards may not be released for test driving.
Unlike § 2507-A(l),
be

prosecuted

as

violations of § 2507 or § 2503 may only

misdemeanors

pursuant

This is not a criminal prosecution,

to

29

M.R.S.A.

§ 2521.

so violations of § 2503 or §

2507 which are found may not be assessed a penalty.

However, the

existence of any such violation may be evaluated in considering
the overall impact of the defendants sales practices.
The

violations

alleged

to

have

occurred

in

one

or

more

instances in this case are as follows :
1.

Sale for use on the highways of a vehicle which could not

7
pass state inspection,
also

violative

of

10 M.R.S.A.

29 M.R.S.A.

§ 1474 (1) (A) .

§ 2503,

but

Such a sale is

no penalty

assessed in this proceeding for a § 2503 violation.
this

violation

are

only

assessed

for

breach

could be

Penalties for

of

warranty

of

inspectability under § 1474(1)(A).
2.

Release for test driving of a vehicle which had not had

an old inspection removed and a new inspection sticker affixed, 29
M.R.S.A.

§ 2507.

No penalty may be assessed in this proceeding

for § 2507 violations.
3.

Failure to inspect within 30 days of sale, 29 M.R.S.A. §

2507-A.
4.

Failure to affix used car buyers guide,

10 M.R.S.A.

§

1475 (1) and (2) .
5.
filled

Failure
out

by

to

affix

certified

an

unsafe

inspection

motor

vehicle

mechanic,

10

disclosure
M.R.S.A.

§

1474 (4) .
6.

Failure to disclose a defect that would prevent vehicle

from passing inspection,

10 M.R.S.A. § 1475(2).

DISCUSSION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS:
With the background of the laws discussed above,

the court

proceeds to address the evidence presented to the court regarding
the asserted violations.

From the evidence,

it is apparent that

no used car sale which is at issue in this case was exempt from
the

inspection

M.R.S.A.

§ 1472,

and

disclosure

requirements

by

operation

of

10

as no vehicle had the "sold for parts or scrap”

8
disclaimer required by section 1472 as a part of its contract.
The various transactions will be separately discussed:
1.

State site visit:

In

early

November

1987,

a

state

Sunshine Auto Brokers sales lot.

investigator

visited

the

On that visit, the investigator

discovered 4 vehicles being offered for sale without the required
used car buyers

guide.

An additional vehicle was being offered

for sale with a blank used car buyers guide.
that these violations,
the

buyers

guides

if they existed,

had

accidentally

Defendants assert

were inadvertent because
fallen

off,

or,

in

one

instance, a vehicle had just been or was about to be painted, or a
vehicle had just been taken in trade.

The evidence indicates that

all the subject vehicles were in positions on the lot indicating
they were being offered for sale.
defendants claims in this regard.
offering a vehicle
guide —

Thus,

the court

rejects the

The court finds 5 violations of

for sale without

affixing a used car buyers

4 violations for offering for sale with no buyers guide

at all, and a fifth violation for offering a vehicle for sale with
a blank buyers guide.
In addition, the state investigator test drove on the highway
a vehicle which had not been reinspected.
2.

Brenda Pelican sale:

On or about July 1, 1987,

Sunshine Auto Brokers sold Brenda

Pelican a 1978 Mercury Monarch.

The State has proven that, at the

time

of sale,

that

it

had

this vehicle
not

properly

could not pass
been

state

reinspected

and

inspection
a

new

and

sticker

9
affixed

prior

to

sale.

Thus,

violations

of

10

M.R.S.A.

§

1474(1)(A) and 29 M.R.S.A. § 2507-A are established in the sale to
Brenda Pelican.
The third violation asserted with respect to this sale,

lack

of an affixed used car buyers guide, is not proven.
3.

Nancy Cleary sale:

On

or

about

July

15,

1987,

the

defendants

sold

to

Nancy

Cleary a 1983 Nissan Stanza which they had taken in trade on or
about June 30,

1987.

The court finds two violations with respect

to this sale.

The vehicle was offered for sale and sold without

the required used car buyers

guide affixed and,

at the time

sale, the vehicle in fact could not pass state inspection.
court

also

determines

that

this

vehicle

was

released

of
The

for test

driving without having a new inspection sticker attached.
4.

Darlene Stratton sale:

On or about October 1, 1987,

the defendants

Stratton a 1978 Dodge Aspen station wagon.
that,

at the

time

of purchase,

she

sold to Darlene

Ms. Stratton testified

advised

Sunshine

that

she

wanted the vehicle for use the next day.

Based on that, the State

asserts

respect

a

number

of

uninspe-cted vehicle
court’s view,
could

seriously

vehicle was in,
day.

the

violations

for use

evidence

believe

on the

highways.

establishes

that

a vehicle,

could be driven,

The vehicle was not in the

being offered for sale.

with

that

to

sale

However,
no

in the

of

an

in the

rational person
condition this

or made ready to drive the next
"line" with the other vehicles

It was behind the Sunshine Auto Brokers

10
building.

On the date of sale,

electrical wires were missing,

it had no batteries,

some other

and it had one or more flat tires .

It was in such an obviously deteriorated state that it could not
pass inspection,
after sale.

and there is no evidence that it ever operated

It was sold without the

"parts or scrap" disclaimer

in the contract required by 10 M.R.S.A. § 1472.
not

recall

However,

if an

to the

was provided,

as

unsafe motor vehicle

extent that
required by

Ms. Stratton could

disclosure was provided.

any unsafe motor vehicle disclosure
10 M.R.S.A.

§ 1474 (4),

filled out by a certified inspection mechanic.

it was not

Thus a violation

for an improper unsafe motor vehicle disclosure was established.
However,

none of the other violations

relating to this vehicle,

claimed by the State, are proven.
5.

Dawn Johnson sale:

On

or about

October

2,

1987,

the

defendants

sold

Johnson a 1982 Plymouth Horizon.

At

defendants were aware that it was

intended that this vehicle be

used on the highways.

other

The

court

the

Thus a violation of the inspectability

The evidence is uncertain with respect to the

claimed violation

guide.

sale,

Also at the time of sale, the vehicle could

not pass state inspection.
warranty is proven.

the time of the

to Dawn

relating

finds

this

to

lack

of a used

violation

not

car

proven

buyers
by

a

preponderance of the evidence.
6.

Amy (Doyon) Conley sale:

On or about May 27,
Conley a 1982 Dodge Omni.

1988,

the defendants

sold to Amy Doyon

11
This sale,
have

extra

and other sales on dates subsequent to this one,

significance

in terms

of the

court's

review

of the

evidence because they occurred after the filing of the complaint.
The original complaint in this matter was filed in early February,
1988 with the defendants receiving service in late March of 1988.
The

original

complaint

generally

asserted

the

inspection

and

disclosure problems, with citations to the appropriate sections of
law, which have been discussed with respect to the earlier sales.
Accordingly,

there can be no question that,

from late March 1988

forward, the defendants were on notice as to the State's concerns
with their sales practices and the requirements of law which their
sales practices
this

sale,

court,

and

were alleged to violate.
subsequent

demonstrate

that

sales
the

Despite

this

notice,

which will be addressed by the

pattern

of

violations

identified

earlier by the State continued after initiation of the
virtually up to the date of trial.

suit and

Subsequent amendments to the

State's complaint have encompassed these later violations.
The 1982 Dodge Omni which Amy Doyon Conley was considering
buying

was

released

to

her

for

inspection sticker being attached.

test

driving

without

a

new

Further, the vehicle was sold

to her rand, at the time of sale, the vehicle could not pass state
inspection.

Thus,

one chargeable violation

is established with

respect to this sale.
7.

Richard McDonald sale:

On or about December 13, 1988, the defendants sold to Richard
McDonald a 1978

Ford Ranchero.

Mr.

McDonald

disclosed to

the

12
defendants that he needed the vehicle for use on the highways.
looked at the vehicle,

He

and was allowed to test drive it, without

the vehicle having been reinspected.

At the time the vehicle was

sold to him,

The old inspection sticker,

it was not reinspected.

which was left on the vehicle,
the time of sale,

expired in June of 1989.

Also,

at

the vehicle was in a condition that could not

pass state inspection.
The sales contract for the vehicle indicated that the vehicle
was

being

sold

"as

is".

That

required that the vehicle be
disclosure.

the

case,

the

law

also

sold with the unsafe motor vehicle

However, no such disclosure was provided, and in fact

the vehicle was
use on the

being

released to Mr. McDonald immediately for him to

highways,

and he

did

so.

It was not

towed to his,

residence, it was delivered to him at the Sunshine lot.
Thus,

three

respect to this

chargeable

violations

are

established

with

sale, plus the unchargeable test driving release

violation.
8.

Edith Grimes sale:

On or about

October

15,

Buick Skylark to Bonnie Powers.

1988,

the

defendants

However,

sold

a 1981

the real purchaser and

intended user of the vehicle was Edith Grimes.

When the vehicle

was purchased,

there was no used car buyers guide attached to it.

Additionally,

at

the

time

of

purchase

defects on the vehicle which made
inspection.
sale,

there

were

a number

of

it incapable of passing state

While the vehicle was not inspected immediately after

at the time it was inspected a number of wear and tear and
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age

related

defects

were

evident.

They

would have

necessarily

existed at the time of sale and rendered the vehicle incapable of
passing

inspection

at

the

time

of

sale.

Accordingly,

two

violations are established with respect to this vehicle.
9.

Alice Wike-sale:

On or about May 15, 1989,
the defendants

as the case was heading for trial,

sold a 1982 Mercury Lynx to Alice Wi k e .

In the

course of discussing the sale, Sunshine indicated to Ms. Wike that
the vehicle had previously been owned or operated by a relative of
the defendants.
been

sold

dealership
The court

to

The truth was that

a

party

in

Clinton

the vehicle had previously

who

had

returned

it

to

the

after the vehicle had developed mechanical problems.
finds that,

with respect to this sale,

the defendants

failed to provide an unsafe motor vehicle disclosure filled out by
an inspection mechanic

and failed to

disclose

to the purchaser

known mechanical defects which the defendants were aware of as a
result

of

purchaser.

the

prior

The

return

of

the

vehicle

from a dissatisfied

court also find violation of used car purchaser

disclosure requirements in this case as a result of the misleading
disclosure regarding the prior use and ownership of the vehicle.
Thus three violations are established with respect to this sale.
10.

Peter Keaton sale:

On or about June 30, 1987, the defendants sold a 1977 Saab 99
to Peter Keaton.
Nissan Stanza,

Peter Keaton

traded

for this

vehicle

a 1983

the vehicle discussed in paragraph number 3 above.

Mr. Keaton indicated to Sunshine that he wanted to trade the more
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valuable vehicle in order to obtain some cash to take a trip.

It

was clear to Sunshine that the vehicle purchased was intended for
use on the highways.

In the trade,, Mr. Keaton received the Saab

and $1,000 in cash from Sunshine.
This sale,
is

addressed

although it is the first in chronological order,

last

because

of the particularly

associated with the sale of this vehicle.
acquired the vehicle
sale to Mr.

Keaton,

serious

problems

Sunshine had previously

from another auto dealer.

At the time

the vehicle had recently been painted.

of
In

addition, the underbody of the vehicle had been sprayed with body
filler and painted black.

The

court

finds the purpose of this

painting and underbody spraying and painting was to hide serious
rusting and deterioration defects
the

vehicle

highly

unsafe

for

in the vehicle which rendered

highway

operations .

The

court

further finds that the defendants could not have been unaware of
the defects in light of their obvious nature and in light of the
painting which was clearly undertaken to hide them.
defendants
underbody

claims

to

spraying

the

and

contrary,

painting

the

was

court

Despite the

finds

sufficiently

that

the

fresh

and

undirtied that it must have been accomplished after the car came
into’
-' the

defendants

possession.

The

problems

with

the

car

included holes in the underbody which would allow exhaust fumes to
enter

the

problems

passenger
which

significantly,

compartment,

rendered

the

defective

vehicle

steering

uninspectable

and

other

and,

most

deterioration of the rear end support system such

that the top of one rear shock absorber was not even connected to

15
the vehicle

in any way,

it was

simply stuck in a cavity of the

body filler which had been sprayed on the underside.
with the rear

suspension rendered the vehicle

This defect

extremely unsafe.

As an inspecting state police officer testified,

had the vehicle

gone over a large bump or pothole, the entire rear end could have
come loose, posing a significant risk of injury to the driver and
any passengers and other persons who may have been on the highway
in

the

vicinity

of

the

vehicle.

In

effect,

this

was

a

very

dangerous vehicle, the defects on which were intentionally covered
up to promote

a sale.

The

specific violations

which the court

finds are as follows:
—

the vehicle

could not pass

inspection,

although

it was

sold knowing the purchaser intended to use it on the highways;
—

the vehicle had not been inspected within 30 days prior to

sale;
-- although the
have been

obvious

to

defective
the

condition

seller,

no

of the

unsafe

vehicle

vehicle

should

disclosure

with this required disclosure of known defects was provided with
the sale; and
—

no used car buyers guide was affixed to the vehicle.

Thus a total of 4 violations are established with respect to
this sale.

GENERAL DISCUSSION:
In the
established

10

separate

a

total

of

events,
24

addressed above,

violations

of

the

the

State

has

inspection

and

16
disclosure requirements of the law.
instances

of

releasing

reinspection.

Further,

sufficient

number

and

a

This does not include several

vehicle

the

cover

for

test

violations
a

driving

without

established

sufficient

period

are

of time,

of
both

before and after thè suit was filed, to constitute a clear pattern
and practice of unfair and deceptive conduct in violation of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
The court must now proceed to consider the State's requested
remedies.
Considering

first

the

question

penalties pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A.

of any mitigation

of

civil

§ 1477(2), the court would note

that the defendants have demonstrated no instance where they had
procedures reasonably adopted to avoid the violations or that the
violations resulted from a bona

fide error.

Instead it appears

evident here that the violations resulted from either ignorance of
the

law

or,

and

certainly

with

the

intentional decision to ignore the law.

later

violations,

an

Thus there is no basis

for excuse from any civil penalty for the violations on which a
penalty is to be assessed.
The court will assess civil penalties pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A.
§ 1477 (-2) or 29 M.R.S.A. § 2507-A(3) as follows:
For each of the violations found by the court and upon which
a penalty can be assessed in the eleven instances of violations,
other

than

the

Peter

Keaton

sale,

which

defendants receiving notice of the suit,
civil

penalty

for

each

violation

of

arose

prior

to

the

the court will impose a
$200.00,

or

a

total

of
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$2200.00 for the seven violations.

A $200.00 penalty is imposed

to recognize that something above the minimum penalty is necessary
because

of

the

widespread

pattern

and

practice

of

violations

indicated by the evidence.
For the four violations which arose out of the Peter Keaton
sale,

the court

violation,

or

will
a

impose

total

imposed on each

of

of these

a civil penalty of $1,000
$4,000.00.

violations,

action in the Peter Keaton

The
because

maximum

for each

penalty

is

of the defendants

sale of intentionally not disclosing

and in fact hiding dangerous safety related defects on the vehicle
sold to Peter Keaton.

These defects, had they gone undiscovered,

presented a significant risk of causing accident and bodily injury
to the purchaser and other persons.
In addition,

the State has proven a total of nine violations

upon which a penalty may be assessed,

for actions which occurred

after the suit was filed when the defendants were on notice as to
what was expected of them.
must

be

necessary

considered
notice

sales practices,

of

more
the

For each of these violations,
serious

State's

because

concerns

of

with

the

which

defendants

regard to

their

the court will impose a civil penalty of $500.00

for each
violation or a total of $4500.00.
■r
Therefore

the

court

imposes

$10,700.00 upon the defendants

a

total

civil

for the 24 violations

penalty

of

which have

been proven in this case and upon which the court has authority to
assess a penalty.
In addition,

pursuant

to

5 M.R.S.A.

§

209

the

court

will
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order

the

purchasers
losses

defendants

to

make

restitution

of the motor vehicles

resulting

from

the

for costs

violations

to

the

individual

incurred to

of

the

restore

inspection

and

disclosure laws found above.
The restitution shall be paid, through the Department of the
Attorney General,

to the

following named individuals and in the

following amounts:
To

Peter

received
vehicle.

and

Keaton:
$48.80

Total

$2,000

for

of

costs

$2048.80

for

the

worthless

associated

with

restitution

to

vehicle

registering
Peter

Keaton

he
the
is

required.
To Nancy Keaton:

$119,87 for uncompensated repairs necessary

for the vehicle to pass inspection.
To

Edith

Grimes:

$978.37

for

repairs

necessary

for

the

vehicle to pass inspection and operate safely.
To Amy Beth Conley:

$375.00 for return of funds paid to get

car back from Sunshine after repair of engine problem where repair
costs not properly disclosed.
Total restitution to be paid through the Department
Attorney General:
As,. addressed

of the

$3,522.04.
below,

the

court

is

issuing

a

permanent

injunction in this matter.

Thus, pursuant to the authority of the

Unfair Trade Practices Act,

5 M.R.S.A. § 209, the court would also

order the defendants to pay the costs of suit and investigation by
the Department of the Attorney General, said cost to be determined
by the

court based on an affidavit to be

filed by the Attorney
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General's Office with the court within 20 days.
the

affidavit,

objections

to

the
the

defendants
affidavit,

shall
after

proceed to determine and assess

have
which

10

After filing of
days

time

costs of suit

to

the

file

court

any
will

and investigation

based on the material presented to it.
The court will also grant the State's request for issuance of
a permanent injunction against the defendants

further violations

of provisions of the laws at issue in this case.

The Defendants

should note that under 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, violation of the terms of
an injunction can result in a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for
each violation.
Therefore, the court ORDERS and the entry shall be:
Judgment for the State tha t :
1.

The defendants,

jointly and severely,

shall pay to-the

court a civil penalty in the amount of $10,700.00.
2.

The defendants,

jointly and severely,

as restitution to the Department
shall be repaid
purchasers

shall pay $3,522.04

of the Attorney General

which

from the Department of the Attorney General

of motor

vehicles

in the

amounts

indicated

to

in this

opinion.
3...

The defendants shall pay costs of suit and investigation

by the Department of the Attorney General based on filings to be
made as indicated in the order above.
4.
them,

Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, the defendants, and each of

and

persons

any

acting

of

their

agents,

employees,

assigns,

for them or under their control

or

other

are permanently
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enjoined from:
A.

Violating any provision of the Used Car Information Act,

10 M.R.S.A. § 1471, £i. seq. .
B.

Violating any provision of the Motor Vehicle Examination

and Inspection Law, .29 M.R.S.A. § 2501 si. se q ., and
C.

Engaging in any unfair or deceptive

with regard to
limited to,
notice

sale of used motor vehicles

violation

requirements

of
of

any of the
the

acts

including,

inspection,

above-cited

or practices

laws

but

disclosure,
and

failing

not
or
to

disclose to prospective purchasers any known safety or mechanical
defects of the motor vehicle

or any defects which would prevent

the vehicle from passing state inspection.

Dated:

July

/V

, 1989
JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT

